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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we show that too strong investor protection may harm small firms and 
entrepreneurial initiatives, which contrasts with the traditional ‘law & finance’ view that 
stronger investor protection is better. This situation is particularly relevant in 
crowdinvesting, which refers to a recent financial innovation originating on the Internet 
and targets small, innovative firms. In many jurisdictions, securities regulation offers 
exemptions to prospectus and registration requirements. We provide an into-depth 
discussion of recent regulatory reforms in different countries and discuss how they may 
impact crowdinvesting. Building on a theoretical framework, we show that optimal 
regulation depends on the availability of alternative early-stage financing such as 
venture capital and angel finance. Finally, we offer exploratory portal-level evidence 
from Germany on the impact of securities regulation on small business finance. 
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‘We need to have some experience with [crowdinvesting] 
before we take away the safety net …  This is a new and 
dramatically different procedure with a high potential for 
fraud.’1 
 




Securities regulation is a driving policy tool for ensuring strong investor protection 
and, thus, stock market development (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006). Traditionally, 
stronger securities regulations emerged in response to financial crises, accounting 
scandals, corporate governance problems and financial innovations. For example, the 
United States (US) Congress adopted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange 
Act of 1934 in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great 
Depression. These regulations were intended to mitigate the information asymmetries 
between securities issuers and investors, complementing former state-level legislation 
in place at the time. Similar actions were taken in other developed countries as a 
response to different financial crises. Moreover, many of the recent regulatory 
changes have been triggered by the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
Securities regulation primarily concerns firms, which seek to place large security 
issues to the general public. More recently, fervent debate about reforming securities 
regulation has arisen from the emergence of crowdinvesting2  (also referred to as 
investment-based crowdfunding3, securities crowdfunding4 or equity crowdfunding5), 
                                                        
1 Source: Wall Street Journal, 1 May 2014. 
2  In   this   paper,   we   use   the   term   ‘crowdinvesting’   (Klöhn   and   Hornuf,   2012;;   Hornuf   and  
Schwienbacher, 2014a) to refer to Internet-based investments in startup firms by a large number of 
natural  persons  (i.e.,   the  ‘crowd’)—sometimes accompanied by co-investments of legal persons (e.g., 
venture capital funds, angel investors or government grants)—with the intention to obtain the residual 
claim on the future cash flows of a firm. The investments offered can be in the form of equity shares, 
debt securities or mezzanine finance (e.g., profit participating loans). 
3 See   the   FCA  Consultation   Paper   CP13/13   ‘The   FCA’s   regulatory   approach   to   crowdfunding   (and  
similar   activities)’ as well as the European Securities and Markets Authority ‘Opinion Investment-
based crowdfunding’. 
4 See Knight, Leo and Ohmer (2012) and the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR Parts 
200, 227, 232 et al. Crowdfunding; Proposed Rule.. 
5 See,   for   example,   the   JOBS   Act,   including   the   term   ‘crowdfunding’,   which   refers   to   transactions  
involving the offer or sale of a security, or Ahlers, Cumming, Günther and Schweizer (2013), who 
define  the  term  ‘equity  crowdfunding’  as  an  investment  model  in  which  investors  receive  ‘some  form  
of equity or equity-like  arrangements’. 
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which refers to a financial innovation in securities issuance that gives small 
entrepreneurs access to the general public. While transaction costs made it unlikely in 
the past that small amounts would be offered to the general public, the Internet now 
provides opportunities to do so. Crowdinvesting has therefore become a viable 
alternative form of external finance for entrepreneurial firms in countries that permit 
the solicitation of the general public without the issuance of a costly prospectus. In the 
US, this is still not the case due to delays in implementing Title III of the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Currently, crowdinvesting in the US is restricted 
to accredited investors, which excludes the crowd to participate. However, in the last 
decade6 crowdinvesting by means of soliciting the general public has emerged in 
Europe, as securities regulations happened to allow it in many jurisdictions. Thus, 
first lessons can be learned from the experience made in European countries so far. In 
this paper, we investigate the impact of securities regulation on crowdinvesting and, 
based on exploratory evidence so far, whether securities regulation should promote 
crowdinvesting in order to offer alternative source of finance to entrepreneurial firms. 
In doing so, we take a multi-disciplinary perspective by integrating ongoing 
discussions on this topic in law, economics and finance literatures. 
 
Securities legislation affects the level of investor protection. Traditional research on 
securities regulation, such as that by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998), who focus on the 
impact of legal rules on stock markets and economic growth, considers measures of 
investor protection that mostly apply to large and publicly traded corporations.7 In 
most jurisdictions, securities legislation offers exemptions that allow firms to issue 
securities outside these legal rules. Such issuances do not offer the same level of 
investor protection, so that inclusion of more exemptions implies weaker investor 
protection in general. Most notably, these exemptions allow firms to issue securities 
to the general public without a formal prospectus that requires compliance with strict 
information disclosure rules and approval by the national regulator. For large firms, 
exemptions are irrelevant. Our approach here is different, because we concentrate on 
smaller firms, which typically outnumber large corporations in the economy (Metrick, 
                                                        
6 Some of the first campaigns on formal portals started in the year 2007 (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 
2014b). 
7 For  a  taxonomy  of  ‘open’  or  ‘public’  versus  ‘closed’  or  ‘private’,  ‘listed’  or  ‘publicly  traded’  versus  
‘unlisted’,  and  ‘closely  held’  versus  ‘widely  held’  corporation,  see  Armour,  Hansmann  and  Kraakman  
(2009). In what follows, we rely on the definitions provided there. 
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2007) and are most likely to benefit from available exemptions. Moreover, securities 
regulations differ across countries along the minimum issuance size that requires 
compliance with prospectus and registration requirements, as we evidence 
subsequently. Such differences enable us to explore the impact of exemptions and, 
thus, investor protection for smaller issuances on crowdinvesting. 
 
This paper aims to understand how securities regulation affects crowdinvesting, in 
particular the exemptions to prospectus and registration requirements. In a first step, 
we therefore provide an overview of the legal regime as well as regulatory reforms 
that have recently taken place in seven different jurisdictions, namely Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom (UK) and the US. We examine 
how securities regulation differs across these jurisdictions and in which form the 
recent reforms have lowered the level of investor protection to promote 
crowdinvesting.  
 
In a second step, we present a theoretical framework based on small firms deciding 
between raising their funds from professional investors (venture capital funds, 
business angels) and launching a crowdinvesting campaign. We assume that 
registration and disclosure of a prospectus reduces the risk of value diversion by the 
management of a firm, but comes at compliance costs. Issuing a formal prospectus 
requires informing investors about the firm as well as how funds will be used in the 
future. It makes management directly liable for future actions (see, for instance, 
Article 6 of EU Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC)8. Escaping registration within the 
permissible exemptions leads to less investor protection and therefore to higher 
                                                        
8 Article 6 (Responsibility attaching to the prospectus)   of   the   EU   Prospectus   Directive   states:   ‘1. 
Member States shall ensure that responsibility for the information given in a prospectus attaches at 
least to the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies, the offeror, the person 
asking for the admission to trading on a regulated market or the guarantor, as the case may be. The 
persons responsible shall be clearly identified in the prospectus by their names and functions or, in the 
case of legal persons, their names and registered offices, as well as declarations by them that, to the 
best of their knowledge, the information contained in the prospectus is in accordance with the facts and 
that the prospectus makes no omission likely to affect its import. 2. Member States shall ensure that 
their laws, regulation and administrative provisions on civil liability apply to those persons responsible 
for the information given in a prospectus.’  Moreover,  Article   5   (The   prospectus)   states:   ‘1. Without 
prejudice to Article 8(2), the prospectus shall contain all information which, according to the 
particular nature of the issuer and of the securities offered to the public or admitted to trading on a 
regulated market, is necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment of the assets and 
liabilities, financial position, profit and losses, and prospects of the issuer and of any guarantor, and of 




agency costs. In contrast, professional investors are assumed to have the ability to 
monitor actively and inefficiently contract away agency problems at a certain cost. 
This simple framework generates the following implications: [a] stronger investor 
protection in form of fewer exemptions can hurt small firms, while more exemptions 
offer small firms access to larger crowdinvesting campaigns; [b] some small firms 
may not issue any securities in the absence of sufficient exemptions; and [c] at the 
country level, benefits that arise from crowdinvesting are highest in the absence of 
sufficiently well developed venture capital and business angel markets. These 
predictions are useful to understand how exemptions in securities regulation affect 
crowdinvesting. 
 
Our approach in modeling the tradeoff is consistent with the arguments made by 
Hazen (2012), who stresses that regulators need to strike a balance between tailoring 
securities law to match the financial needs of small firms and, at the same time, 
protecting investors to a reasonable extent. Because greater investor protection adds 
greater costs and burden to firms, smaller firms may not be able to comply, hence 
discouraging entrepreneurial activities. Dharmapala and Khanna (2014) examine the 
impact of retroactive changes in information disclosure requirements on recent initial 
public offerings in the context of the JOBS Act of   2012   (the   ‘emerging   growth  
companies’   exemption) and provide empirical support for the notion that weaker 
investor protection may be beneficial to smaller firms. Dambra, Field and Gustafson 
(2014) further show that these regulatory changes fostered more IPOs of small firms; 
i.e., those affected by the JOBS Act. In our study, we formalize the discussion by 
offering a theoretical framework that helps explain the effect both on firms’ 
incentives to rely on crowdinvesting and on medium-sized firms that then must face 
tradeoffs in terms of whether to rely on the available exemptions or comply with 
disclosure and registration requirements as larger firms do.  
 
In a final step, we collect unique data on crowdinvesting practices in different 
European countries. Although data collection is limited because markets are still 
nascent, we offer first evidence on how crowdinvesting markets are currently 
emerging and affected by the regulation in place. Consistent with our predictions, our 
empirical analysis indicates that firms raise inefficiently low amounts of money when 
the exemptions are restrictive. The German case best evidences these funding 
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constraints. We use hand-collected data to examine ceteris paribus two distinct legal 
frameworks.  While  most  campaigns  were   limited   to  €100,000   initially   (the  previous 
legal limit in Germany for prospectus exemption), amounts raised became 
significantly larger after the usage of specific securities (partiarische Darlehen) that 
were not subject to prospectus regulation in Germany. This suggests that exemptions 
affect crowdinvesting and the type of investors currently participating in campaigns. 
Moreover, we document through anecdotal evidence that some portals limit the 
participation of crowdinvestors by imposing high minimum investment tickets as a 
way to be able to make use of other exemptions in the prospectus regulation. 
Importantly, imposing high minimum investment tickets has the effect of attracting 
sophisticated investors, which are more often in the position to fend for themselves. 
 
Our analysis concludes that strong investor protection through fewer exemptions may 
hurt entrepreneurial initiatives that rely on security offers, because small firms are not 
able to support the costs related to compliance, in contrast with large firms for which 
stronger investor protection is beneficial. The negative impact on such entrepreneurial 
initiatives may be even stronger in countries in which other equity investors, such as 
business angels and venture capitalists, are absent, because these investors could offer 
alternatives to close the entrepreneurial funding gap for seed finance. A notable 
parallel can be drawn with regard to labor protection and legal capital. Saxenian 
(2000) documents that an essential element promoting entrepreneurial activities and 
innovation in Silicon Valley is the poor level of labor protection in California. Weak 
labor protection makes it easier for entrepreneurs to hire and fire employees, while 
employees can easily leave the firm and work elsewhere or start their own firm. 
Another example is the minimum capital requirement for new firm incorporations. 
Braun, Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf (2013) report that the reduction or 
abolishment of the minimum capital requirement in five major European jurisdictions 
not only helped promote domestic legal forms but also increased the extent of 
entrepreneurship in the respective economies more generally.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents an 
overview of the concrete exemptions that are effective in the securities laws of 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom (UK) and the US. We 
also discuss ongoing reforms in these jurisdictions that aim at promoting 
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crowdinvesting. Sections 3 and 4 develop a theoretical framework that investigates 
aspects of optimal securities regulation for crowdinvesting, which then enables us to 
derive empirical predictions on how the design of exemptions affects securities 
issuance and investment in firms that use crowdinvesting. Section 5 provides some 
first empirical evidence whether securities regulation should promote crowdinvesting 
or not. Section 6 discusses how the rules have performed so far and concludes.  
 
2. RECENT REFORMS PROMOTING CROWDINVESTING 
 
In Europe, crowdinvesting has challenged securities regulation because it makes use 
of exemptions, as defined in the national regulation of prospectus and registration 
requirements. This enables firms to raise external finance while avoiding incurring 
significant compliance costs.9 In many countries, the capital raised in crowdinvesting 
campaigns falls under exemptions, most importantly with regards to the amount of the 
offer. For example, in the European Union (EU), firms do not need to comply with 
the   prospectus   requirement   if   the   amount   of   the   offer   does   not   exceed   €100,000  
within a 12-month time interval. However, many EU member states apply a 
significantly  higher  threshold,  some  up  to  € 5,000,000. Other exemptions refer to the 
maximum number of investors to whom the offer is made, the minimum contribution 
imposed on investors, the minimum denomination of the securities offered and 
whether  the  offer  is  made  to  ‘accredited’  or  ‘qualified’  investors only.  
 
Recently, regulators around the world have realized the economic potential of 
crowdinvesting and started easing the national securities regulation. In recent years, at 
least seven jurisdictions have reformed or will soon modify their securities regulation 
to suit the needs of crowdinvesting more effectively, while also protecting investors 
from fraud up to a certain level and reducing legal uncertainty for issuing firms. 
Regulatory changes have largely occurred in response to crowdinvesting issuers not 
being able to exploit the existing legal exemptions for their business needs and from 
                                                        
9 The initial compliance costs of a typical IPO often exceed $1,000,000 because issuers must conduct a 
due diligence; hire a legal counsel and an underwriter; and pay SEC filing fees, state securities filing 
fees, stock exchange or OTC registration fees, accounting fees and an increased D&O insurance 
premium (Bagley and Dauchy, 2003). For crowdinvesting, costs are lower because offers are made by 
smaller, simpler startups, which also do not seek a public listing. Still, according to Darren Westlake, 
founder of the UK portal Crowdcube, costs for such prospectus approvals are in the range between 
£20,000 and £100,000 in the UK (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012). 
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lobbying efforts by the alternative investment industry. In what follows, we 
investigate how legislators have tried to unwind the inefficiency at the firm level that 
will be the basis of our theoretical model. These main reforms are also summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
2.1. United States 
 
As a principal rule of US securities law, securities that are offered to the general 
public must be registered with the SEC. This is to protect investors from securities 
fraud by holding the issuer and underwriter of the security liable in case of material 
misstatements or omissions of material facts. However, to account for the needs of 
small offerings, exemptions to this rule exist. For example, accredited investors who 
can  ‘fend  for  themselves’  or  public  offers  up  to  $5,000,000  have  been  exempted  from  
registration with the SEC. However, while the former exemption does per definition 
not apply to the larger crowd, the latter exemption was of no use for crowdinvesting 
because registration at the state level was still required, making a geographically 
dispersed offer prohibitively expensive.10 
 
It was mainly for this reason that the US Congress passed detailed rules specifically 
tailored to crowdinvesting. On April 5, 2012, the JOBS Act was signed into law, 
amending the existing exemptions for raising capital under § 4(6) of the Securities 
Act. According to Title III of the JOBS Act (also referred to as CROWDFUND Act; 
Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act), 
issuers can now raise an overall amount of up to $ 1,000,000 during a 12-month 
period without filing a registration statement with the SEC or at the state level. The 
legislator tied this exemption, however, to three conditions: the usage of a broker- 
dealer or funding portal, limitations on the amount that can be sold to individual 
investors and disclosure requirements for the issuers. 
 
                                                        
10 The implementation of Regulation A+ now allows US issuers to raise up to 50 million USD from 
non-accredited investors. Filing requirements with the SEC under Regulation A+ are still extensive, 
which is why it might not become a successful legal exemption for crowdinvesting issuers. 
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According to § 4(6)(C) of the Securities Act, issuers can now offer or sell securities 
without a registration statement if the transactions is conducted through a broker-
dealer or funding portal as defined in § 3(a)(4) and § 3(a)(80) of the Securities 
Exchange Act. In this way, the JOBS Act de facto established a private gatekeeper for 
crowdinvesting issues, which is supposed to ensure the correctness and completeness 
of the securities offered. However, the JOBS Act did not make explicit that funding 
portals would be liable for material misstatements or the omission of material facts by 
the issuer. While the JOBS Act explicitly states that crowdinvesting issuers will be 
liable for such offenses, it could be argued that the liability of the funding portal can 
be derived from Rule 10b-5 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as well as 
previous Supreme Court decisions (Knight et al., 2012).  
 
In addition, the US legislator strives to protect investors through limiting the amount 
that an investor may invest in the entire market (aggregate limit). According to the 
JOBS Act, this aggregate limit shall not exceed the greater of either $2,000 or 
5 percent of the annual income or net worth of an investor if either the annual income 
or the net worth of the investor is less than $100,000. If the annual income or the net 
worth of the investor is equal to or exceeds $100,000, the aggregate limit sold to the 
investor shall not exceed 10 percent of either its annual income or net worth, with the 
respectively greater value applying. In any case, the maximum aggregate limit sold to 
a single investor shall not exceed $100,000. 
 
Finally, § 4A(b) of the Securities Act defines the type of information that must be 
disclosed to potential investors. If the overall amount of the securities issue is equal to 
or below $100,000, issuers must provide their most recent income tax returns and 
financial statements, which must be certified by the principal executive officer of the 
issuer. For issues of more than $100,000 but less than $500,000, financial statements 
must be provided and reviewed by a public accountant, who should be independent 
from the issuer. Furthermore, the accountant must use professional standards and 
procedures for the review. For issues of more than $500,000, the issuer must provide 
audited financial statements. 
 
In summary, the US crowdinvesting legislation has not only established a maximum 
value for offers without a prospectus but also set thresholds for the amounts an 
10 
 
individual can invest. By considering the compliance costs associated with the 
provision of information, the JOBS Act further outlined a three-step approach on 
information disclosure. These regulatory measures were combined with the 
establishment of a private gatekeeper. Although the US was the first country to pass 
specific legislation on crowdinvesting, not a single issue has taken place so far, as the 
SEC still must implement specific rules. 
 
2.2. Selected Reforms in the European Union 
 
The prospectus regulation in the EU has been harmonized for offers larger than 
€ 5,000,000 through directives that were enacted through national implementation 
laws by the respective EU member states. Therefore, it is useful to first present EU-
level regulation for prospectus regulation before discussing the recent reforms 
undertaken by individual jurisdictions. 
 
A main attempt to harmonize regulation on registration statements was made with the 
Directive 2003/71/EC of 4 November 2003, which specifies when and how a 
prospectus must be published when securities are offered to the public. More recently, 
it was amended by the Directive 2010/73/EU of 24 November 2010, which, among 
other things, modified the extent of certain exemptions. Since this directive came into 
effect, exemptions to publishing a prospectus apply if at least one of the following 
criteria is met: 
[a] The offer is addressed solely to qualified investors; 
[b]  The offer is addressed to fewer than 150 natural or legal persons per member 
state, other than qualified investors; 
[c]  Investors  purchase  securities  for  a  total  consideration  of  at  least  €100,000  per  
investor;  
[d]  The  denomination  per  unit  amounts  to  at  least  €100,000;;  and 
[e] The offer of securities represents   a   total   consideration  of   less   than  €100,000  
over a 12-month period. 
In addition to these exemptions, Directive 2010/73/EU stipulates that national 
regulators of the EU member states have discretion to increase the amount in point [e] 
up   to   €5,000,000,   either unconditionally or subject to additional requirements 




The  former  Directive  2003/71/EC  stipulated  thresholds  of  100  in  point  [b],  €50,000  in  
points   [c]   and   [d],   and   €2,500,000   for   the   additional   discretion given to national 
regulators. Hence, the new directive does not mean less investor protection per se. 
While changes made in point [b] extend exemptions, points [c] and [d] reduce the 
possibilities to obtain an exemption, because the threshold values have increased from 




The Italian legislator amended the existing securities law (TUF, Testo Unico della 
Finanza) and adopted the first specific crowdinvesting legislation in Europe. On 
October 20, 2012, the Decreto Legge n. 179/2012 (Decreto Crescita 2.0) went into 
effect. Exemptions now apply to ‘innovative   startups’—so-called startups 
innovativa—offering common equity shares via online portals.11 Innovative startups 
complying with the law can now make offerings of   up   to   €5,000,000   without   the  
obligation to register a prospectus. For non-innovative startups, the critical value of 
€100,000   as   stipulated   by   Directive   2010/73/EU   should still apply. However, law 
n. 179/2012 has determined that ‘only innovative startups’ are allowed to raise capital 
online through crowdinvesting portals, thereby potentially prohibiting other firms 
from collecting capital via the Internet.12 
 
The  legal  definition  of  an  ‘innovative  startup’  is  geared  to  corporations,  which  are  not  
registered with a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility and fulfill the 
following criteria: 
[a] The incorporation and business operations of the firm should have taken effect no 
more than 48 months ago; 
[b] The management is located in Italy, and the main business activities of the firm 
take place in Italy; 
                                                        
11 Under Decreto Crescita, firms raising capital online are not allowed to issue any type of security. 
When Consob implemented the regulatory guidelines, it stipulated that innovative startups could only 
sell common equity. 
12  The Italian securities law (TUF, Art. 100-ter, para. 1) stipulates that ‘public offers conducted 
exclusively via one or more portals dedicated to the collection of capital may have the sole purpose of 
the underwriting of financial instruments issued by innovative start-ups and must have a total amount 
lower than that determined by Consob pursuant to article 100, subsection 1, letter c)’. 
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[c]  The annual turnover in the second year of business as stated in the last accounts 
does  not  exceed  €5,000,000;; 
[d]  The firm does not and did not make payouts to shareholders using previous 
corporate profits; 
[e]  The sole or main purpose of the firm is to develop, produce and sell innovative 
products or services with a high technological value; 
[f]  The firm was not established as part of a merger, de-merger or sale of a 
corporation or corporate entity; and 
[g]  The firm fulfills at least one of the following conditions: 
1) The firm invests at least 15 percent of the greater of the annual production 
costs or the production value in R&D; 
2) One-third of the employees have obtained a PhD, are enrolled in a university 
PhD program or two-thirds of the employees have obtained an academic 
degree or have worked for more than three years in a private or public research 
institution; and 
3) The firm owns a patent on an industrial, biotech or electronic semiconductor 
innovation or owns the right on a software, which is registered in the public 
software register, related to the purpose of the corporation. 
 
Although the Italian securities regulator (Consob, Commissione Nazionale per le 
Società e la Borsa) was required to set up a public register and define disclosure 
requirements for innovative startup issuers, it did not have to define which 
exemptions and critical value for issues without a prospectus would apply for non-
innovative startups. In summary, the Italian crowdinvesting regulation established a 
very narrow exemption, which might lead to a considerable amount of legal 
uncertainty13. By 2014, the Italian crowdinvesting market was still very small, with 
the leading portal SiamoSoci selling minimum investment tickets in the range of 
€5,000   to   €50,000,   largely   imitating   an   Internet-based business angel network. In 
January 2015,14 the Italian regulator has also allowed innovative small and medium 
                                                        
13 Operationally,   it   remains   very   unclear   what   ‘innovative’   means   when   it   comes   to   raising   capital  
online. See for instance the case of Pawlonia s.r.l., http://www.repubblica.it/ rubriche/startup-
stories/2014/08/26/news/crowdfunding_caso_ paulownia-94459210/).  
14 See Decreto Legge n. 45 (Decreto Investment Compact) from January 20, 2015, which is currently 
being discussed in the Italian parliament.   
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In July 2013, the Austrian legislator changed the national securities law (KMG, 
Kapitalmarktgesetz) and raised the critical value for issues without a prospectus from 
€100,000  to  €250,000.  In  October  2013,  the  first  crowdinvesting  was  then  offered  to  
investors by the portal 1000x1000, with the first issuer Woodero raising a total of 
€166,950  after  a  nearly  eight-week funding period. The amount clearly exceeded the 
initial threshold of the critical value for issues without a prospectus, indicating that 
issuers would have been constrained under the earlier regulation. Austria recently 
adapted a new regulatory scheme and   is   going   to   allow   issues   up   to   €5,000,000  
without requesting a prospectus from the issuer. 
 
C. United Kingdom 
 
The UK appears to possess one of the most developed crowdinvesting markets that 
currently exist, with Germany being the closest contestant. By early 2014, issuers in 
both countries raised more than  £28,000,000  and  €20,000,000   respectively   (Collins,  
Swart and Zhang, 2013; Hornuf, 2014). In the UK, crowdinvesting currently takes 
place under the general securities regulation, more precisely the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000.  
 
In October 2013, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) initiated a consultation on a 
specific crowdinvesting regulation. The new rules were enacted in April 2014 and aim 
to   make   crowdinvesting   ‘more   accessible   to   a   wider,   but   restricted,   audience’   of  
investors, while  also  ensuring  that  ‘only  those  retail  investors  who  can  understand  and  
bear the various risks involved are invited to invest in unlisted shares or debt 
securities’.   Similar   to   the   US   approach,   the   FCA   only allows the brokering of 
securities to sophisticated investors, high net worth investors, corporate finance 
contacts or venture capital contacts, retail clients who confirm that they will receive 
                                                        
15 The definition of an innovative SME is conceptually the same as the definition of an innovative 
startup. Some of the thresholds that are relevant to be eligible differ.  
14 
 
regulated investment advice or investment management services from an authorized 
person, or retail clients who certify that they will not invest more than 10 percent of 




As a member state of the EU, France implemented the Prospectus Directive 
2010/73/EU and thus applies the same rules as other EU jurisdictions, with some 
adaptations. The exemption for security offers with a total amount of less than 
€100,000   applies.   However,   for   the   range   between   €100,000   and   €1,000,000, an 
additional exemption applies if the total amount raised does not exceed 50 percent of 
the  existing  equity  capital  of  the  firm.  For  example,  a  firm  can  raise  €200,000  without  
a  prospectus  and  registration  if  it  already  possesses  equity  capital  of  at  least  €400,000. 
This is unlikely to occur for firms relying on crowdinvesting, because they generally 
have little capital on the balance sheet before a successful campaign. The French 
portal  Anaxago  does  not  use  the  €100,000  limit  to  exempt  firms  from  the  prospectus  
regulation but rather limits the offer to fewer than 150 non-accredited investors. This 
means that the portal gives access to the documentation and contract of a specific 
investment offer only to a maximum of 149 people. Consequently, investors are 
required to participate with high minimum tickets, as only a subset of the 149 people 
may eventually invest. The advantage is that the total amount of the equity issuance is 
not  limited  to  €100,000.  For  the  offerings  successfully  completed  so  far,  the  average  
number of crowdinvestors on Anaxago is 25, with an average amount raised of more 
than  €320,000. 
 
Importantly, French portals need to obtain a license from the French securities 
regulator AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers) because they act as financial 
intermediaries and thus are subject to their own rules. The former legal status and 
requirements in terms of capital imposed on financial intermediaries made it costly 
for portals to comply.  
In 2013, the AMF proposed a framework aimed to facilitate crowdinvesting with the 
goal to regulate both the portals and the issuers. This proposal was under public 
                                                        
16 The  FCA’s  regulatory  approach to crowdfunding over the Internet, and the promotion of non-readily 
realisable securities by other media, Policy Statement 14/4, March 2014. 
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consultation until November 2013. On February 14, 2014, the ministry of economic 
affairs and finance announced measures that has become effective in autumn 2014 
(see Ordonnance nr. 2014-559 of 30  May 2014 and Décret  d’Application nr. 2014-
1053 of 16 September 2014). Among other things, the new regulation contains the 
following items with regard to crowdinvesting using securities (the reform also 
concerns crowdlending, which in part is regulated differently than security issuances):  
[a] The creation of a separate legal entity for accredited portals from differs from the 
one that other financial intermediaries use (so-called Conseiller en Investissement 
Participatif); no minimum equity capital is required for this legal entity. 
However, it must comply with transparency rules that ensure that the crowd 
obtains ‘fair’ and ‘unbiased’ information on the offers. 
[b] Investors must undergo a test that determines their risk profile, the results of 
which must be in line with the risks involved in crowdinvesting. Crowdinvestors 
must also be made aware when registering at the portal of the risks involved in 
crowdinvesting. 
[c] The threshold   of   exemption   to   be   increased   to   €1,000,000,   provided   the  
crowdinvesting campaign takes place on an Internet portal that has received 
formal approval of the AMF. 
[d] Obligation of the issuers to supply simplified documentation to the investors, as 
described in the reform; however, this documentation is not subject to approval 




In 2014, Belgium introduced a reform (see Loi du 25 avril 2014 portant des 
dispositions diverses, published at the official journal Moniteur Belge on 7 May 2014 
nr. 36946), as a way to foster crowdinvesting while at the same time acting cautiously 
to avoid a bubble. Before, Belgium imposed   the   amount   of   €100,000   for   the   small  
offerings exemption with full prospectus requirement for any issuance above that 
amount.  The  new  regulation  allows  issuances  up  to  €300,000  provided  no investor is 
allowed   to   invest   more   than   €1,000   per   campaign. Unlike in the US, the Belgian 
regulator has thus defined the amount that an investor may invest in the same issuer 
(single issuer limit) not the overall market. The law requires that issuers explicitly 
state this single issuer limit in the offer. If the single issuer limit is not imposed, 
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issuers remain limited at raising no more than €100,000. However, the Belgian market 




Unlike other European countries, Germany recently passed a specific legislation and 
for a long time followed a laissez-faire approach towards crowdinvesting, which had 
taken place within the scope of the existing securities law (see Weinstein, 2013, for a 
related discussion). As a general rule, the German Securities Prospectus Act (WpPG, 
Wertpapierprospektgesetz) set the critical value for issues without a prospectus equal 
to   €100,000   (§   3   Abs.   2   Satz   1   Nr.   5   WpPG).   However,   the   definition   of   what  
constitutes an investment was not all-encompassing and left out specific forms of 
profit participating loans (e.g., partiarische Darlehen). In turn, this omission left 
scope for the issuers either to comply with the existing exemptions and raise up to 
€100,000   or   to   bypass   the   securities   law   altogether   by   structuring   the   investment 
contract in a way that allowed for offers of unlimited amounts.  
 
On 23 April 2015, the German Parliament passed the Small Investor Protection Act 
(Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) to regulate crowdinvesting more specifically. According 
to the new regulation, startups can offer  up   to  €2,500,000 without the obligation to 
register a prospectus. Similar to the US JOBS Act, the amount sold to a single 
investor shall generally not exceed €1,000.   Investors  might  invest  up  to  €10,000 per 
campaign if their wealth (balance on the bank account or on other financial 
instruments)   exceeds  €100,000.   If the investor does not have that amount of assets, 
the   limit   is   twice   the   investor’s  monthly  net   income,  but in any case not more than 
€ 10,000. Most importantly, this new rule again holds only for specific forms of 
securities (Nachrangdarlehen and partiarische Darlehen), which did previously not 
fall under the definition of an investment. For other types of investments, which are 
commonly used in crowdinvesting campaigns (stille Beteiligungen), startups will only 
be   able   to   offer   €100,000 without the obligation to register a prospectus (Klöhn, 
Hornuf and Schilling, 2015). 
 




In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that allows us to examine the 
impact of exemptions to prospectus regulation on the fundraising decisions of small 
firms, who can decide between active, professional investors (such as venture capital 
funds or business angels - called ‘professional investors’ in what follows) and the 
general public (the crowd). The model offers a setting that considers the issuance of 
non-listed securities without a registered prospectus. In line with securities 
regulations, offering securities to the general public without a valid prospectus is only 
possible within existing exemptions. Our model focuses on the main exemption from 
the prospectus regulation, namely the total amount of the offer. Although our 
theoretical model develops a general setting for such small offerings, it suits 
particularly well small firms that seek to attract crowdinvesting. These firms are more 
likely to face the tradeoff between crowdinvesting and other forms of early-stage 
entrepreneurial finance such as venture capital or angel finance, as considered here. 
The proposed analysis will help understand how the emergence of crowdinvesting as 
alternative source of equity finance to professional investors affects the firm's choice 
of financing source and ultimately optimal regulation. This in turn may offer guidance 
in the question whether regulation should promote crowdinvesting. As we will see, 
part of the answer depends on the degree of development of the venture capital and 
business angel markets. 
 
To this end, we model an economy populated by a continuum of firms that differ 
along their capital needs and seek external funding. Our theoretical framework is 
based on managerial rent diversion (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). 17  Managers 
divert rents away when not properly monitored. While professional investors are 
assumed able to cope with such managerial inefficiency, the crowd is assumed not be 
able to adequately monitor management. As mentioned earlier, a formal prospectus 
requires disclosure of specific information and sets clear liability for issuers in case of 
inappropriate actions, misleading information and/or misrepresentation. These 
requirements are necessary in the event of general solicitation such as done in 
crowdinvesting, where investors cannot easily fend for themselves. In what follows, 
and consistent with practice, we consider only crowdinvesting campaigns without a 
                                                        
17  Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) build on existing literature that includes earlier work on rent 




formal prospectus. In order to derive optimal regulation, we further consider a 
benevolent regulator that decides on the level of exemptions. 
 
3.1. Issuing Firms 
 
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of firms uniformly distributed 
along the capital needs dimension   θ ̃ ~ [0 ; Θ], which specifies the level of their 
individual investment opportunities. Firms have a return on investment (ROI) of v > 0 
(identical for all firms) up to the   level   θ̃   and 0 beyond. 18  Thus,   the   amount   θ ̃ 
represents external capital needs as well as desired investment size.  
 
Under this setting, a firm raising and investing an  amount  θ  ≤  θ ̃will generate value of 
(1   +   v)θ.   The   resulting   net present value (NPV) equals   vθ, given that investments 
represent  θ. If not adequately monitored, entrepreneurs can  divert  a  fraction  δ  >  0  of  
the NPV so that shareholders eventually receive only a value of (1 - δ)vθ. 
Entrepreneurs privately extract a value of (1 - x)δvθ from this diversion,  where  0  ≤  x  
≤  1;;   the  remaining fraction x (i.e.,   the  value  xδvθ) is lost in the course of the value 
diversion. The fact that this fraction x is lost generates an inefficiency. To restrict the 
analysis to the case in which agency costs arise, we limit inefficiency to the following 
condition: 
 
 DIVERSION CONDITION: x < 1 / (1 + v) 
 
The Diversion Condition ensures that, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs will divert 
corporate resources whenever they are not constrained by shareholders or regulation. 
 
3.2. Funding Choices: Professional Investors Versus Crowdinvesting Campaigns 
 
We assume that firms have no internal funds available and thus need to raise the 
entire capital externally. For simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur initially 
owns 100 percent of the firm. When raising capital, entrepreneurs give up a fraction 
(1 - α)  of  the  equity  and  retain  the  rest.  The  value  of  α  is  determined  so  that  the  crowd 
                                                        
18  Assuming  instead  that  ROI  <  0  for  investments  above  θ̃  would yield qualitatively similar results. 
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or investors are willing to invest (which is a take-it-or-leave-it offer), while facing an 
opportunity cost of 0. By  construction,  we  require  0  ≤  α  ≤  1.  
 
Let us suppose these firms may also get funding by professional investors such as 
venture capital funds or business angels as alternative to launching a crowdinvesting 
campaign. We assume that these professional investors can enforce internally 
effective governance rules; this mechanism is less likely to be enforceable under 
crowdinvesting, because the crowd is dispersed and rather passive. In addition, the 
crowd does not sit on the board of directors of the firms. However, business angels 
and venture capitalists traditionally do enforce contracts, because they hold larger 
equity stakes and participate on the board of directors. Moreover, they generally draft 
tailored contracts that enable effective intervention in case founders do not behave 
due diligently. However, intervention by professional investors is time-consuming 
and thus costly. For costs, we define them by the variable M > 0. It seems sufficiently 
plausible that efficient private contracting by sophisticated investors offers at least the 
same level of efficiency gains by reducing agency costs as in the case of regulatory 
compliance. In any case, we regard costs M as monitoring and management costs19 
and thus these costs are borne by the investors, not the issuing firm. However, rational 
investors will take them into account when setting their terms for an investment.  
 
To enable practice-relevant implications, we introduce the fact that the availability of 
finance from professional investors such as venture capital funds and business angels 
varies across countries. While such investors are well developed and able to inject 
very large amounts in startups in some countries (e.g., the USA), these amounts tend 
to be smaller in other countries (e.g., continental Europe). Thus, let us consider the 
maximum amount professional investors can provide to be denoted by S. The 
parameter S proxies for the development of the venture capital and business angel 
market in the country. This assumption can be motivated by the fact that venture 
capital funds tend to be much smaller in Europe than in the US due to smaller supply 
of capital to the venture capital markets, combined with the standard restrictions that 
                                                        
19 Under M, we consider any costs other than 'effort costs' that would lead to moral hazard.  Thus, we 
do not consider an incentive-compatibility constraint of investors, since we assume costs M as those 
costs that are borne by investors by the sake of being 'sophisticated'. These costs include legal costs as 
well as costs incurred from running a management firm. Should there also be costs that investors can 




venture capital funds typically cannot invest more than a certain amount or percentage 
of total funds in a single portfolio company (Gompers and Lerner, 1996; Metrick, 
2007). For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1996) document that 78 percent of LP 
agreements include restrictions on the size of investment that can be made in any one 
portfolio company. While the amounts can be scaled up through syndication, this is 
more likely in later stages of development.  
 
The second source of funding considered here is crowdinvesting, which involves 
raising the amount of capital from a large number of small investors. These crowd 
investors may want to impose similar corporate governance and disclosure rules that 
mitigate agency costs. However, this possibility seems only realistic in the presence 
of sophisticated investors, as we assume here; that is, even if such governance rules 
were included in a contract, crowdinvestors could not enforce them because of 
coordination problems that result from free-riding among crowdinvestors. Crucially, 
the Diversion Condition states that even if such rules are negotiated, the entrepreneur 
may want to deviate and thus still extract personal benefits. This occurs when proper 
governance cannot be enforced by crowdinvestors. We consider this to be a 
reasonable assumption for the considered market, given the type of individuals 
participating in crowdinvesting campaigns.  
 
3.3. The Regulator 
 
The regulator imposes registration and ex ante disclosure requirements for any 
security offer to the general public above a given threshold amount T ≥ 0, which can 
be larger or smaller than S. No prospectus is required when securities are issued to 
professional investors, as this resembles a private offer. A higher threshold value 
implies lower investor protection in general, because fewer firms comply with 
securities regulation. We define the variable T as representing an exemption from the 
general registration and ex ante disclosure requirements imposed by national 
regulators. This view is consistent with real-world exemptions, as we have shown in 
Section 2, where   we   discussed   that   in   Europe   this   value   ranges   from   €100,000   to  




Complying with these requirements leads to fixed costs of C > 0 for the firms, which 
may differ from monitoring costs M incurred by professional investors. These 
compliance costs may arise for different reasons; some may be incurred by filing with 
the regulator, while others may be due to the disclosure of relevant information to 
investors. We assume firms complying with disclosure regulation do not face agency 
costs (i.e., entrepreneurs can no longer divert value for private purposes). Consistent 
with practice, we assume that firms can only seek compliance with the regulator if 
their capital needs are larger than T. In what follows, we assume that costs C are too 
high for the firms considered in our model. This excludes issuing securities with a 
prospectus and thus raising an amount larger than T other than from professional 
investors. 
 
We consider a benevolent regulator who maximizes total welfare in the economy, that 
is the sum of value created by the firms seeking external finance.20 This means that 
the regulator is not subject to any inefficiency or agency problems. Rather, the 
regulator balances the costs and benefits generated by setting the variable T. 
 
3.4. Time Line 
 
We consider the following time line. First (at time t = 0), the regulator sets T, which 
becomes public knowledge. This sets the scope for crowdinvesting campaigns. 
Second, at t = 1 the firm decides whether to raise funds from a professional investor 
or through a crowdinvesting campaign. Next, at t = 2 entrepreneurs make investment 
decisions, by deciding how much to raise and thus offer a fraction (1 - α)  of the cash 
flow rights to the crowd or professional investor. Given the assumptions made, 
crowdinvesting limits the issue amount to T. Professional investors can supply up to 
S. Finally, at t = 3 firms realize their payoffs, which are then distributed. Consistent 
with rational behavior, we solve the game by backward induction and maximize firm 
value based on the entrepreneur's perspective.   
 
                                                        
20 The literature distinguishes between two main types of theoretical models of regulation (Mulherin, 
2007):   [a]   ‘public   interest   theories’,   which   are   based   on   the   idea   that   regulation   acts   in   response   to  
market failure, such as information asymmetry problems, and thus regulation is designed to mitigate 
market  failure  and  thereby  improve  social  welfare,  and  [b]  ‘special  interest  theories’,  which  argue  that  
regulation is put in place because of political lobbying of interest groups. Our approach fits the first 
type of model. 
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4. OPTIMAL CHOICE OF FUNDING AND SECURITIES REGULATION 
 
4.1. Optimal Outcome for the Entrepreneur 
 
In this section, we derive the optimal choice of funding. We first consider outcome of 
each source separately and then compare them. 
 
Case [1]: Under crowdinvesting, an entrepreneur   with   given   capital   needs   θ̃   ≤   T 
receives α[(1  +  v)θ ̃- δvθ]̃ + (1 - x)δvθ̃, subject to the crowd's participation constraint 
(1 - α)   =   θ ̃ / [(1 + v)θ̃ - δvθ]̃. The first term represents her financial gains   (net   of  
diversion   costs   δvθ̃), the second one   (i.e.,   (1   -   x)δvθ)̃ her private benefits from 
diversion. This leads to the following gains for the entrepreneur: (1 - xδ)vθ̃. Any  firm  
with  θ̃  > T will not raise more than T, as otherwise the firm would need to obtain a 
costly prospectus approval; thus, gains are capped at (1 - xδ)vθT. 
 
Case [2]: Under professional investor finance, the entrepreneur will   raise   capital  
amount  of  θ̃  ≤  S  and receives α(1  +  v)θ̃, subject to investors' participation constraint 
(1 - α)  =  [θ̃  +  M]  /  (1  +  v)θ.̃ Here, only financial returns accrue to the entrepreneur, 
since no diversion takes place. Thus, the entrepreneur receives  vθ̃ - M. Any  firm  with  
θ̃  > S will have its gains capped at vT - M. 
 
Both outcomes under [1] and [2] are depicted in Figure 1 whenever S > T. It is 
straightforward to derive the threshold level of T, called Ṯ, that makes crowdinvesting 
as efficient as professional investors; i.e.,  
  Ṯ  such that  (1 - xδ)vṮ = vṮ - M  or:   
Ṯ =  M  /  xδv 
 
Therefore, crowdinvesting is optimal choice of entrepreneurs seeking capital lower 
than Ṯ, and opting for professional investors is optimal whenever capital needs are 
larger than Ṯ. Above the amount S, professional investor can no longer supply the full 
amount, so that the firm needs to seek prospectus approval from the regulator to 
initiate a private placement larger than that amount. However, in countries with a well 
developed venture capital market, this amount S may be very large and therefore not 
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binding as long as the startup operates in an industry area that is the scope of venture 
capital funds (mainly segments with high growth potential). 
 
When S < T (i.e., the venture capital and angel market is under-developed), a 
discontinuity occurs. The size of the discontinuity depends on the magnitude of the 
difference between S and T, as depicted in Figure 2. 
 
[Figure 1 and 2 around here] 
 
It is optimal for the entrepreneur to seek crowdinvesting below Ṯ for the same reason 
as above, but potentially also for larger amounts if the small offer exemption level T 
is large enough to make it worthwhile. In the case depicted in Figure 2, this is not 
happening, but would happen if T would be as large as ₸. Then, larger crowdinvesting 
campaigns would occur. ₸ can formally be derived as the solution to the following 
condition: 
 (1 - xδ)vṮ = vṮ - C  or:   
₸ = C /  xδv 
 
4.2. Market Equilibrium under Endogenous Regulation  
 
Figures 1 and 2 are helpful in deriving the optimal level of exemption, denoted below 
as T*, from the perspective of the securities regulator. Crucially, this level is affected 
by the degree of development (or efficiency) of the venture capital and business angel 
market. However, a note is warranted here. Our optimal outcome abstracts from 
effects that such exemptions may have on other firms seeking equity finance. 
Therefore, we will consider below the lowest possible exemption value as being the 




Formally, the optimal level of exemption for crowdinvesting is as follows:21 
 T* = Ṯ if ₸ < S 
 T* = ₸ if ₸ > S 
 
This result yields the following empirical implications. First, note that a more 
developed venture capital and business angels market has a higher S (i.e., they can 
finance larger investments as funds are larger) and lower M (i.e., they are able to do 
more cost-efficient contracting monitoring, leading to lower costs M).22 The latter 
(about M) enables a lower threshold Ṯ; the former (about S) allows startups to raise 
larger amounts from professional investors and thus does not require the regulator to 
set a higher level of exemption. For sufficiently large venture capital and business 
angel markets, the exemption level can even be substantially reduced. 
 
Moreover, when S > T, the condition derived above (Ṯ =  M  /  xδv)  indicates that Ṯ is 
decreasing in the following, exogenous parameters: the profitability (ROI) of projects 
(the   parameter   v),   extent   of   managerial   rent   diversion   (the   parameter   δ),   and   the  
degree of losses derived from such diversion (the parameter x). All these predictions 
are intuitive, except perhaps for ROI. Projects with higher profitability or value 
potential will benefit more from monitoring, making funding from professional 
investors more valuable relative to crowdinvesting. Greater rent extraction 
possibilities creates higher cost of capital under crowdinvesting, since crowd investors 
will require a higher rate of return for purchasing securities from the firm. Similarly, 
greater losses from diversion makes again crowdinvesting less valuable relative to 
professional investors, which favors the latter and thus reduces the threshold for the 
entrepreneur. Given the reduced threshold, the optimal level of exemption is also 
reduced (since T* = Ṯ in this case). 
 
For the opposite case where S < T (see Figure 2), the regulator has incentive to 
increase T to compensate for shortage of professional investor finance. The optimal 
                                                        
21  This  form  of  solution  assumes  projects  are  not  scalable;;  i.e.,  firms  cannot  start  projects  with  less  than  
their  θ̃.  Under  the  assumption  of  scalability  (i.e.,  firms  can  raise  any  amount  θ  ≤  θ̃  and earn returns v 
per unit of capital), then there would be a  discontinuity  in  capital  target  at  S,  since  any  θ  close  to  the  
right of S yield lower levels of profits. However, our conclusions on optimal policy would not be 
affected from a qualitative point of view.  
22 Empirically, costs M may be proxied by the number of law firms, as this affects legal costs of 
drafting contracts and advising services for venture capital funds.  
25 
 
level is ₸, as shown in Figure 2. This scenario corresponds to cases in which venture 
capital and business angel markets are under-developed, as these investors then tend 
to manage smaller funds in which average investment sizes become small. Overall, 
we expect countries with smaller venture capital and business angel markets to have 
the incentives to follow more restrictive exemptions. 
 
4.3. Empirical Implications 
 
The parameter T can be directly interpreted as the level of investor protection, in 
which a lower value of T represents more investor protection on average. The 
conclusions of our theoretical model lead to the following empirical predictions. First, 
more investor protection leads to fewer crowdinvesting campaigns, since the bulk (if 
not all) of these campaigns take place under securities regulation exemptions. This 
may eventually create a smaller crowdinvesting market, because many firms will find 
it economically not worthwhile to seek prospectus approval by the national regulator. 
Others may seek financing from professional investors. In the absence of any 
exemptions, smaller firms may even refrain from entering the market in the first 
place, since crowdinvesting may be their only option in terms of equity finance. The 
complete absence of an exemption (T = 0), such as that in the US, leads to exclusion 
of firms with the lowest capital needs. This is especially true if there is not a 
sufficiently large, professional market available as main alternative source of seed 
capital. These professional markets are composed of business angels (so-called 
informal market) and venture capital firms (so-called formal market).  
 
Our main conclusion from this analysis is that regulation that maximizes investor 
protection (which implies no exemptions at all) hurts small firms, and those relying 
on crowdinvesting are likely to be smaller firms seeking seed or early stage capital. 
This is because these firms are too small to obtain funding from professional investors 
and thus may lack alternative sources of equity capital. At the country level, optimal 
regulation trades off the costs of ensuring sufficient investor protection in firms that 
can afford these costs and for which it is efficient to impose them with the benefits of 
ensuring access to capital to smaller firms. Extensive access to capital, however, 




Crucially, the extent to which exemptions to the prospectus regulation are needed 
depends on the availability of alternative sources of capital, mostly from professional 
investors. Countries with well developed markets of professional, private investors 
may have fewer exemptions. Interestingly, the US has a well developed formal and 
informal markets (i.e., venture capital and angel markets), which can compensate for 
the lack of exemptions needed to tap the crowd. This contrasts with Europe, where the 
angel market is small. A greater development of these markets (leading to an increase 
in S; e.g., larger venture capital funds active in the economy) reduces the benefits 
from crowdinvesting and even the use of prospectuses for raising private funds more 
generally.  
 
We further expect a substitution to occur away from professional investors, not for 
startups with lower capital needs but with average levels. These firms now have an 
alternative source of funding, namely crowdinvesting. For some firms, the latter may 
economically be more interesting, so that they seek funding from the crowd instead of 
professional investors. In fact, changing the level of small offer exemption T may 
have no impact on crowdinvesting activities in business sectors that are well covered 
by professional investors, except for very small issuances. However, other areas may 
be affected more when poorly covered by professional investors. This may be more 
likely in areas with limited growth prospects. 
 
5. SHOULD SECURITIES REGULATION PROMOTE CROWDINVESTING: 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
In this section, we illustrate the impact of exemptions as defined in national securities 
regulation on crowdinvesting campaigns, the type of investors attracted, and the 
structure of portals. While data availability does not permit large-scale analysis, our 
approach is to offer different pieces of evidence on such impact. Our work is therefore 
exploratory. However, we believe these pieces of evidence are insightful and 
meaningful for contributing to a discussion on current initiatives to reform securities 
regulations as a means to encourage crowdinvesting.  
 
To achieve this goal, we proceed as follows. First, we offer evidence that restrictive 
exemptions may create a funding gap, in that firms raise inefficiently low amounts of 
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capital. Second, we offer survey evidence from two specific German portals that non-
sophisticated investors acting as crowd investors are relatively well educated and 
diversify well their portfolio. And third, some portals set minimum tickets to attract 
only the wealthiest investors and therefore impose their own restrictions, which 
suggests portals use mechanisms of self-regulation to complement legal restrictions. 
These pieces of evidence will be helpful in our final discussion on whether securities 
regulation should promote crowdinvesting. 
 
5.1. Structure of Crowdinvesting Campaigns 
 
As our theoretical model predicts, firms may restrict their fund-raising goal if the 
small offer exemption threshold is low. One good example is Germany, which for a 
long time set the  critical  threshold  at  the  lower  bound  of  €100,000.  We illustrate this 
argument by relying on the cases of Seedmatch and Companisto. Moreover, like 
many other continental European countries, the German venture capital and business 
angel markets are much less developed than in countries such as the US and UK. 
  
On October 31, 2011, Seedmatch successfully funded the first two startups through 
crowdinvesting in Germany. The contracts that Seedmatch provided to issuers were 
initially designed to comply with the German securities law (more precisely, the 
exemptions under § 8f Abs. 1 Satz 1, 1.Fall VerkProspG aF until May 31, 2012, and 
afterwards § 2 Nr. 3 lit. b VermAnlG). All the initial 26 crowdinvestings offered by 
Seedmatch used this exemption, and a total of 24 issues had to be terminated at the 
threshold of the exemption at €100,000,   which   indicates   that   issuers   had   higher  
capital needs. Moreover, as campaigns were sometimes funded very quickly23, firms’ 
capital needs could have easily been satisfied by the crowd and were only constrained 
by the existing threshold under the securities law (see Figure 3). 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
                                                        
23 On  November  29,  2012,  it   took  Protonet  only  48  minutes  to  raise  €200,000  on  Seedmatch.  In  May  
2014,  the  same  startup  raised  another  € 1,500,000 in 10 hours and 8 minutes, after which the founders 
decided  to  continue  raising  funds.  Eventually,  they  raised  € 3,000,000 in a few days only. 
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Seedmatch and other portals soon realized the legally imposed funding constraint and 
tried to circumvent the existing securities legislation. On November 29, 2012, 
Seedmatch offered for the first time a new investment contract—the so-called 
partiarische Darlehen, which until recently was not classified as investment under the 
German securities law and thus did not require the registration of a prospectus. While 
there was some legal uncertainty surrounding this issue, the partiarische Darlehen 
allowed issuers to raise unlimited amounts without the obligation to draft and register 
a prospectus. The largest issue funded under this contractual design Protonet 2 raised 
a  total  of  €3,000,000 in June 2014. 
 
The crowdinvesting campaigns on Companisto show a similar trend after the portal 
switched contracts to the partiarische Darlehen on February 4, 2013. After the 
implementation of the new investment contract, Companisto was able to more than 
double the funding volumes per campaign, while in the case of Seedmatch, they more 
than tripled. The idea that the increase in funding volumes does not merely reflect a 
general trend in the selection of funding campaigns provides a comparison with 
Innovestment, which might serve as a control group because the portal has not 
adopted the partiarische Darlehen so far. The average funding size at Innovestment 
was   €83,155, just   below   the   threshold   of   €100,000, and increased only slightly to 
€91,594  in the period when Seedmatch adopted the partiarische Darlehen. 
 
However, at least in some cases, the type of firm that received funding under the 
unrestricted investment contract changed as well. Average and median pre-money 
valuations of the firms listed increased for Seedmatch and Companisto, as did the 
average and median total assets of the firms making a securities offer (see Table 2). 
Although average and median pre-money valuations of Innovestment campaigns 
increased as well in the period after Seedmatch introduced the partiarische Darlehen, 
average total assets of firms offering their securities on Innovestment decreased 
greatly. This pattern could be interpreted as a first sign of money chasing deals in the 
sense of Gompers and Lerner (2000), as the most profitable firms had already offered 
their securities on one of the major crowdinvesting portals. This observation receives 
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support because not only did the average number of investors increase but so too did 
the average amounts they put down in a single campaign.24 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
In November 2013, crowdinvesting in Germany begun taking place under the 
traditional prospectus regime, which provides a legally well-known approach to raise 
larger amounts. The portal Bergfürst placed an issue with a total amount of 
€3,000,000  offering  ordinary  shares   to   investors.  The   issuer  published  a  prospectus,  
which was previously approved by the German securities regulator (BaFin, 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht). Apparently, the funding volume of 
€3,000,000  was  sufficient  to  cover  the  compliance  costs  of  drafting  and  registering  a  
prospectus. Around 1,000 investors funded the issuer Urbanara in an IPO auction. 
 
5.2. Investors Characteristics 
 
While securities law shapes the structure of crowdinvesting campaigns, 
crowdinvesting campaigns, in turn, affect the types of investors participating. As 
mentioned previously, some portals offer comparatively large minimum investment 
tickets to the crowd. This creates a way for the portals to filter the crowd. 
Consequently, certain investors are de facto excluded from crowdinvesting. The 
Financial Conduct Authority (2013, p. 37) reports  that  crowdinvestors  in  the  UK  ‘tend  
to be high-net   worth   individuals   with   investment   experience’.   The   same   holds   for  
many users of the German crowdinvesting portals, on which average investments 
range from approximately €308  (Companisto)  to  €3,243 (Innovestment). 
 
In the case of Innovestment, minimum   investment   tickets   range   from   €500   to  
€25,000. According to a survey by Klöhn and Hornuf (2012), more than half the 
Innovestment user base is self-employed, 41 percent are employed at a firm and the 
remaining 5 percent are either pensioners or civil servants (Figure 4, a). Moreover, 
many Innovestment users pursue a profession that might require solid knowledge of 
startup firms and finance. The majority of Innovestment users either are executives 
                                                        
24 That the average number of investors decreased in the case of Innovestment might be due to the 
portal increasing  the  minimum  investment  ticket  in  some  campaigns  up  to  €25,000.   
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themselves or work in consulting, management, information technology, banking or 
financial services (Figure 4, b). Although this can be considered a first indicator of 
their financial sophistication, these investors are generally not as active to affect the 
governance rules of the startup as outlined in the theoretical model in Section 3.3. 
Innovestment users also report having experience in other assets classes (Figure 4, c). 
Four of five Innovestment users claim to have invested in ordinary stocks, while two-
thirds have experience with investment funds and certificates. Such investment 
experience implies that the investments of the crowd constitute only a small part of 
the  crowd’s overall portfolio.  
 
Even within this particular asset class, the crowd appears well diversified. In the case 
of Companisto, in which the   minimum   investment   tickets   start   at   €5   (potentially  
attracting less sophisticated investors), the majority of the financiers who invested in 
the  campaign  ‘Schnuff  &  Co’  in  December  2013  were holding a portfolio of five or 
more startups on Companisto alone (Figure 4, d). A considerable number of investors 
had even invested in 20 or more startups. The actual size of their crowdinvesting 
portfolios might even be larger because investors are likely to diversify their 
portfolios across various portals.  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
In sum, securities law is not the only mechanism, which is capable to exclude a 
particular group of investors. The self-imposed rules by some of the portals can be 
effective to attract those investors, who are in the position to fend for themselves. And 
as the nestor of US-securities regulation Louis Loss (1988) phrased it, in securities 
markets  ‘(e)veryone  has  the  right  to  make  a  fool  of  himself’. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study discusses ongoing reform attempts in different countries and presents 
empirical evidence based on the European experience in permitting non-accredited 
investors access to crowdinvesting. While our analysis remains exploratory, it 
contributes to the ongoing policy debate on how to regulate this market and to 
examine its potential impact on business finance. This debate is motivated by the fear 
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expressed by some regulators and academics that entrepreneurs may take advantage 
of the less sophisticated crowd, by strategically avoiding to raise capital from 
sophisticated investors (Hazen, 2012; Griffin, 2014).  
 
Our simple theoretical framework generates key policy implications in relation with 
alternative sources of entrepreneurial finance. A central implication is that benefits 
related to weaker investor protection that promote crowdinvesting is higher when the 
availability of venture capital and angel capital is scarce, but lower when these 
professional markets are well developed. If no specific legal exemption is available 
that suits the needs of crowdinvesting issuers, crowdinvesting is unlikely to develop. 
If a regulation exists, crowdinvesting portals often need to adopt a structure similar to 
that of angel-investing networks (e.g., by limiting participation to 'accredited' or 
'qualified' investors), which limits participation to wealthy investors. This is 
particularly true for portals operating in the US, such as CircleUp, which is set up as a 
private, password-protected network for accredited investors only. 25  A tailored 
regulation may therefore be needed for crowdinvesting, as securities regulation 
primarily deals with regulating large issuances and therefore impose significant 
compliance costs that are prohibitively high for small firms. Moreover, a lack of 
specific regulation for crowdinvesting may induce portals to resemble online angel 
networks and thus offer little differentiation with existing sources of entrepreneurial 
finance. 
 
We further conclude that regulation may apply to the issuing firms, the crowd and the 
portals. The countries considered herein tend to adopt approaches regulating the three 
actors differently. Doing so affects the level of investor protection of the crowd as 
well as the costs imposed on firms. From our presentation of different reforms 
undertaken by European countries and the US, we can categorize approaches in 
several ways, according to the relative weights put on regulating investors' access to 
securities, the portal as gatekeepers, or the issuers (mostly in terms of information 
disclosure and exemptions). So far, Germany has until recently adopted a laissez-faire 
approach by avoiding a specific regulation for crowdinvesting. German portals could 
develop very quickly and match firms with potential crowdinvestors more easily and 
                                                        
25 See https://circleup.com/getting-started/ (last accessed February 2, 2014). 
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at relatively low costs. Moreover, German issuers had much flexibility as specific 
investments were for a long time not part of the investment definition for prospectus 
approval. In contrast, portals in France need to be registered at the national regulator 
as financial intermediaries. This leads to higher costs but also more investor 
protection. The recent amendments made are likely to have reduced these costs but 
made portals gatekeepers. The approach adopted by the US is to regulate not only the 
portals but also the crowd, by limiting the extent of risk it can take. As mentioned 
previously, non-accredited investors will be entitled to invest through registered 
portals up to a specific fraction of their annual net income or wealth. In contrast, other 
countries such as the Netherlands do not regulate investment opportunities by the 
crowd. 
 
Securities regulation ensures that investors receive the needed information to evaluate 
the company at the time of issuance and, provided that the information is accurate and 
complete, to obtain a fair value for their investment. A complementary way to protect 
the crowd is through sound corporate governance ex post, an important aspect that has 
received scant attention in the regulatory debate. Information disclosure is an 
important component of good governance, but it is not enough; in other words, it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. Although it is a necessary condition to track 
whether an entrepreneur misbehaves, investors also need a mechanism and incentives 
to intervene to mitigate such misbehavior. In the absence of these, founders may lack 
accountability. Professional investors, such as business angels and venture capitalists, 
protect themselves through well-designed contracts and the inclusion of covenants in 
shareholder agreements. Such investors also tend to hold a large stake, in contrast 
with crowdinvestors, who are more dispersed shareholders. To protect 
crowdinvestors, portals, which often help draft contracts, need to offer effective 
contracts.  
 
Relatedly, these contracts should ensure that firms are able to raise follow-up funding, 
including funding from professional investors who may contribute larger amounts if 
the company develops high-growth potential. Some contract terms may hinder the 
capacity of startups to raise more money, if control rights are not properly specified in 
previous contracts. Problems of similar nature may arise such as in situations in which 
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venture capitalists consider investing in startups that already have business angels as 
shareholders. 
 
Finally, other forms of financial regulation may impact crowdinvesting practices, 
including regulations directly pertaining to portals themselves as well as specific 
aspects of national corporate law. For instance, national corporate law also affects the 
entrepreneurial choice of equity or debt finance. In the case of Germany, of the 115 
successful funding campaigns up until February 15, 2014, only one issuer opted for 
equity. The most important reason issuers have adopted debt or some mezzanine form 
of finance is that incorporating and transferring shares of a private limited liability 
company requires incurring the costs of a notary (Braun et al., 2013), while the 
mezzanine form of finance used by the majority of issuers does not. From a regulatory 
perspective, it is more than inconsistent that mezzanine instruments can now be sold 
without a prospectus in an aggregate amount of up to €  2.5  million,  whereas  common  
equity shares   can   be   issued   only   up   to   an   amount   of   €   100,000,   albeit equity 
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Table 2 compares funding characteristics for the German crowdinvesting portals 
Seedmatch, Companisto and Innovestment under the restricted setting when the 
exemptions under the German securities law apply (pre–partiarisches Darlehen) with 
the unrestricted setting when Seedmatch and Companisto circumvent the exemptions 
using a specific type of investment (post–partiarisches Darlehen), which allows 
issuers to offer unlimited amounts without registering a prospectus with the securities 
regulator. Innovestment never changed its investment contract to circumvent the 
exemption threshold of the German securities law. The data cover the period from 
August 1, 2011, to March 7, 2014, and are hand-collected from the portal websites 
(www.seedmatch.de, www.companisto.com and http://innovestment.de). Total assets 
were collected from the public register (www.unternehmensregister.de) as well as the 








Financing Outcomes when S > T 
INV-finance denotes the outcome under financing with professional investors, CI-finance with 
crowdinvesting. The x-axis represents the amount to be issued, while the y-axis the entrepreneur's 
profit level. The point Ṯ corresponds to the situation where the entrepreneur is indifferent between the 







Financing Outcomes when S < T 
INV-finance denotes the outcome under financing with professional investors, CI-finance with 
crowdinvesting. The red line shows the outcome with a formal prospectus, for which amounts of 
issuances must be larger than the threshold T. The x-axis represents the amount to be issued, while the 
y-axis the entrepreneur's profit level. The point ₸ corresponds to the situation where the entrepreneur is 
indifferent between crowdinvesting and financing with a formal prospectus (if the threshold where 










Figure 3 shows amounts raised in crowdinvesting campaigns on Seedmatch (N=51), 
Companisto (N=24) and Innovestment (N=43) in the period from August 1, 2011, to 
March 7, 2014. The red lines separate the period before and after financial contracts 
were designed to circumvent the threshold of the small offering exemption as defined 
in   the  German  securities   law  (T=€100,000).  Before  financial  contracts  circumvented  
the threshold, the average amounts  raised  were  €98,048  for  Seedmatch campaigns and 
€91,673   for   Companisto campaigns; thereafter, the   amounts   rose   to   €330,854   and  
€210,134   respectively.   Innovestment never changed its investment contract to 
circumvent the threshold of the German securities law and exhibits an average 


































































10% 9% 9% 
7% 
















































































































(c) Investment experience of Innovestment users in 2012 (N=557). The figure reports 





(d) Portfolio diversification of Companisto investors (N=363). The figure reports the 
density function for the number of investments financiers made with Companisto 
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